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5
And Power Corrupts ... :
Religion and the Disciplinary
Matrix of Bioethics
M. Therese Lysaught

Religion and Public Bioethics: Complicating the
Received Narrative
"Public bioethics" is often positioned as a sub field in the discipline
of bioethics. It is depicted as a public practice of deliberation or debate among professionals or a plurality of voices about how society
should proceed in the face of a particular problem related to health
care or biotechnology. Such debate seeks to produce some level of
consensus via rationally coherent arguments useful for formulating
guidelines to be promulgated by policyrnakers (aka public policy)' or
for influencing the beliefs and values of the public. Daniel Callahan
and others, in fact, differentiate this sense of "public" bioethics from
other forms ofbioethics that they variously label "foundational,"
"clinical," "pedagogical," "institutional," "community," "civic," and
so on. 2
Yet to limit "public" bioethics to the action of public panels,
public conversations, or the crafting of government regulation and
health policy is somewhat artificial and misleading. For contemporary images of the clinical setting are structured along similar lines.
The clinical context is narrated as a pluralistic space where a diverse
set of people-patients, physicians, nurses, allied health workers,
families-come together as both strangers and moral strangers yet
are bound to work together cooperatively. To resolve moral disagreement, various stakeholders must meet and, through reasoned conversation, craft a balance between the strictures of institutional/public authority and individuals' rights to pursue their own goods. In
fact, Bette-Jane Crigger notes (with concern) that medicine (by
which she means the clinical setting) is well on its way to becoming
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"a privileged domain-perhaps the preeminent domain-of public moral discourse in contemporary American society.'" The public, it seems, is everywhere.
One could in fact argue that there is no subcategory of bioethics that is
not public. One reason is that the bioethical architecture of what are deemed
to be putatively distinct arenas draws on a shared narrative of public space, a
narrative whose "core thesis ," as Michael Sandel puts it, is this:
Society, being composed of a plurality of persons, each with his own
aims, interests, and conceptions of the good, is best arranged when
it is governed by principles that do not themselves presuppose any
particular conception of the good; what justifies these regulative
principles above all is not that they maximize the social welfare or
otherwise promote the good, but rather that they conform to the
concept of right, a moral category given prior to the good and independent of it. This is the liberalism of Kant and of much contemporary moral and political philosophy.4
Again and again, the settings of particular subfields ofbioethics as well as the
ways in which they locate and choreograph agents within those settings reproduce this narrative.
Not only does this narrative give a particular shape to the practice ofbioethics across contexts. 5 It tells a consistent story about religion. Across the
board, from the pluralistic contexts of public to clinic, religion presents a problem. 6 Religions posit beliefs that are, by definition, not held in common and
as such cannot provide a shared basis for moral exchange.' At best, they are
denied intrinsic moral value. 8 At worst, they emerge as one of the primary
sources of moral conflict. Belying their apparent neutrality toward religious
convictions, Tom Beauchamp and James Childress in their highly influential
Principles of Biomedical Ethics return again and again to a particular example
of self-destructive behavior, "bizarre actions prompted by unorthodox religious
beliefs. "9 One of the few other contexts in which religious convictions are mentioned in their text is in the conflictual situation of refusal of treatment. 10 In a
similar fashion, H. Tristram Engelhardt, the once-despairing champion of the
Enlightenment project in biomedical ethics, again and again rhetorically
equates the terms "particular," "religious," "parochial," and "ideological."" Examples abound to demonstrate how the dominant mode ofbioethics no longer
takes theological or other substantively rational authors seriously but rather
simply deems them irrational and outside the purview of legitimate argument.12
Yet it is not just that religious beliefs confound the canons of moral consensus and rationality. As problematic as religion can be in the clinical setting,
to allow participation of religion within the practice of public bioethics can be
even dicier. James Childress, in his account of the process behind the NBAC
report on human cloning, names the fundamental issue:
Arguments for and against a significant role for religious convictions in public policy appeal to two different fears , which may be
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more or less plausible depending on the particular liberal, pluralistic
democracy at a particular time. On the one hand, opponents often
fear religion's divisiveness. John Rawls begins his book on political
liberalism with the story of religious conflict in the West, and we
know full well religion's role in conflicts around the world. Many
who argue for a reduced role, or no role at all, for religious convictions in public policy share this fear, and it is not unreasonable.13
Religion, in other words, must be handled carefully vis-a-vis the public sphere
because it is inherently dangerous and violent.
Childress's remarks echo one of the foundational myths that undergird
the U.S. liberal social vision described earlier by Sandel. As Judith Sklar tells
the story:
Liberalism ... was born out of the cruelties of the religious civil
wars, which forever rendered the claims of Christian charity a rebuke to all religious institutions and parties. If the faith was to survive at all, it would do so privately. The alternative then set, and still
before us , is not one between classical virtue and liberal selfindulgence, but between cruel military and moral repression and violence, and a self-restraining tolerance that fences in the powerful to
protect the freedom and safety of very citizen. I.
The modern state, in other words, arose out of what came to be known as the
"wars of religion" of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, as that force
necessary to make the peace. Behind the pluralist narrative outlined earlier,
then, lies a vision of the state as the necessary hedge that protects individuals
against the coercive tyranny of religious authority and the inevitable violence
inherent in religious difference.
The story of the state as that which saves us from the violence of religious
passion, as the agent of peace, has become canonical for both U.S . public policy
and bioethics. More important, it is historically and theologically false. Theologian William Cavanaugh carefully displays that the received story that the
liberal state emerged as a response to religious violence gets the matter backward.15 Drawing on the work of social theorists and historians Charles Tilly,
Quentin Skinner, and Richard Dunn, Cavanaugh compellingly argues that the
modern liberal nation-state began to emerge well in advance of the wars of
religion, documents how indeed most of these wars were not fought between
Protestants and Catholics but rather between co-religionists (i.e., between Protestants and Protestants or Catholics and Catholics) , and shows how emerging
religious identities were manipulated as tools of unflinching Politiques in their
quest for state power.
Cavanaugh argues that key to emerging states' ability to foment such wars
was the very creation of the modern category of "religion." Through the Middle
Ages, religion was understood as a virtue, deeply intertwined with bodily practices located within the institutional structure of the Roman Catholic Church.
But in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the term "religion" began to
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be used in a new way. It begins to refer to a system of beliefs, a set of propositions that could be held by newly minted modern "individuals" and that could
exist separately from one's public loyalties to institutions of church or state.'6
Thus, as he notes: "To call these conflicts 'Wars of Religion' is an anachronism,
for what was at issue in these wars was the very creation of religion as a set of
privately held beliefs without direct political relevance. "17
Cavanaugh convincingly demonstrates that this theoretical reconfiguration
of Christianity as a now fractured diversity of religions fit not only with Enlightenment epistemological presuppositions but, more important, was employed as a tool for wresting power from the only institution strong enough to
stand against the state, namely the church. "True religion," in Locke's words,
found a new home not in a public, communally extended and authoritative
institution but rather in the private and solitary confines of an individual's
mind and conscience. As such, the medieval configuration of disciplinary authority split between church and state was dismantled: "What is left to the
Church is increasingly the purely interior government of the souls of its members; their bodies are handed over to the secular authorities."'8 The state, in
other words, assumed unchallenged disciplinary control over individuals' bodies as religion was brought into service of the sovereign.
Cavanaugh's account upends the foundational myth that sets the terms of
debate in the conversation on religion and public bioethics. With others, it
reveals the problematic nature of the concept of ,religion' as it functions within
the field ofbioethics.'9 It displays as mythical the fear that Childress identified
as not unreasonable. And it unmasks the modern state's claim to be the keeper
of peace rather than what it is-the purveyor of violence on a scale preViously
unimaginable.
But Cavanaugh's rereading of the historical record does more than challenge the very way 'religion' is conceptualized within bioethics; more fundamentally, it problematizes the very depiction ofbioethics itself. Far from being
an open, public deliberative practice that involves reasoning with other citizens
or a limited set of procedural norms that facilitate the full range of individual
value judgments, bioethics instead has become part of the disciplinary matrix
of the modern social order, a key practice in the state's management of bodies
within its purview.
For bioethics, like its ally medicine, is about nothing if it is not about
bodies. Bioethics does an extraordinarily good job at masking this fact; rarely
will one see bodies referred to, even obliquely, within the discipline ofbioethics.
The various distinctions between subfields ofbioethics (especially distinctions
between 'clinical bioethics' and other types) are but further attempts to distance
the discipline from the bodies that it organizes.
It will be the burden of this essay to make this case, that bioethics ought
properly be understood as a disciplinary matrix that serves the modern Leviathan of state and market. The purpose of doing so, of course, is to narrate a
rather different vision of 'public bioethics.' For without a more accurate accounting of the nature and function of public bioethics, it will not be possible

RELIGION AND TH E DISCIPLIN A RY MATRI X OF BIOETHICS

97

to begin to posit how 'religion' might even begin to position itself in relationship to it.
Cavanaugh's account of the reconfiguration of the relationships between
religion, bodies, and the state is clearly indebted to the legacy of Michel Foucault, a debt I share. For those who are not familiar with Foucault, I begin with
a brief overview of his analytic framework. The major work of the essay will
be to display how bioethics fits the Foucauldian paradigm. So as to avoid the
appearance of special pleading, I will turn not to theologians to develop this
account20 but rather to social scientists and bioethicists.

Bodies and Disciplinary Matrices
Robert Zussman and others have recently argued that bioethics can and ought
to learn from sociology.21 Foucault might well have concurred, holding as he
did that medicine is a mode of applied sociology.n Although Foucault is not
quite what Zussman has in mind, for those who have read his account of
medicine as well as his work on power, knowledge, and discipline, it is but a
small step from there to the field ofbioethics.23
Central to Foucault's analysis is a recognition of the material reality of
bodies and the politics that is nothing other than production and organization
of bodies within culture.24 Bryan Turner, one theorist who has attempted to
systematize a theory of the body, sum marizes Foucault's thesis: "The body as
an object of power is produced in order to be controlled, identified, and reproduced."25 Power, for Foucault, is not negative per se. Rather, it is essentially
productive. As Anthony Giddens notes, "Power is actually the means whereby
all things happen, the production of things , of knowledge and form s of discourse, and of pleasure."26 Joanne Finkelstein extends this definition, capturing
its more decentered, circulatory, weblike, operational sense:
Power is a strategy of relations that gives some individuals and
groups the ability to act and keep acting for their own advantage.
Power is also the ability to bring about a desired situation and to
prevent the actions of those who would thwart such desires .27
Key to the productivity of such power is the fact that it is wielded not in an
overt, coercive manner but rather that individuals come to wield it over themselves. In other words, within a regime of disciplinary power, each personby internalizing the norms and surveillance of the social order-effectively
disciplines her or himself. As such, Finkelstein writes, this exercise of power
is "extremely subtle as it can direct individuals toward actions the eventual
outcome of which will not necessarily be to their advantage."28 The basic goal
of disciplinary power is to produce persons who are docile-persons, in other
words, who do not have to be externally policed.29
But how does this occur? How does it happen that individuals-or rather
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individuals vis-a.-vis their bodies-become formed in such a way as to internalize the agenda of the wider social order? What, in other words, are the
mechanisms of governmentality?30 Bodies are constituted, Foucault and others
argue, via disciplinary matrices consisting of the intersection of three key elements: discourses, practices, and institutions."
A discourse is that body of concepts and statements that make possible the
appearance of objects at a particular historical moment and provide a language
for talking about them. Discourses define and produce objects of knowledge,
governing the ways a topic can be meaningfully talked about and reasoned
about. Variously put, nothing that is considered meaningful exists outside discourse, nothing has any meaning outside of discourse, and nothing outside of
discourse is considered meaningful. 32
Social theorist Arthur Frank pushes this definition one step further, noting
how deeply allied discourses are to bodies. Discourses, he notes, are:
cognitive mappings of the body's possibilities and limitations, which
bodies experience as already there for their self-understanding . ...
These mappings form the normative parameters of how the body
can understand itself. . .. Discourses only exist as they are instantiated in on-going practice or retained by actors as "memory
traces.""
One example of such a discourse would be the modem scientific account of
anatomy. Arising in part out of the structures of the human body, it equally
arranges, depicts, defines, and describes the way in which inhabitants of Westem culture literally "map" their bodies; bodies no longer consist of humors or
mime the structures of the heavens, but instead are composed of organs, systems, tissues, cells, DNA, and so on. Equally, the languages of disease and
illness are discourses mapping bodies' self-understandings.34
Dorothy Smith refers to discourses as "extralocal texts-texts created elsewhere-that organize action and relationships in local settings by instructing
actors in those settings as to what they should do and perhaps proscribing what
they cannot do."" Frank elaborates on Smith's reading of discourse with the
example of DRGs:
In medicine, diagnostic-related groups (DRGs) . .. are a prime example of discourse . .. . DRGs are written documents, created by a
group of specialists working on the basis of individual clinical experience and aggregate data but working apart of any specific scene of
clinical practice. These specialists produce a code of diagnosis-all
illness must map into DRG categories to be treated-and detailed
specifications of what count as reimbursable services for each category. DRGs, as a textual code created elsewhere, thus organize activity in local clinics. People in local settings still make decisions and
deliver care, but the text limits and directs what they can do.36
This particular example highlights a key feature of discourses-that the content
of the "extralocal text" is understood as technical or formal knowledge, knowl-
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edge that is increasingly esoteric, the purview of specialists and elite professionals.
As such, knowledge associated with discourses becomes a mode of social
power. As Finkelstein notes:
Where knowledge becomes a source of power, as it does with technicalor formal knowledge, it is the technocrat, the owner, the controller of knowledge, who gains social power. Significantly, when technical knowledge is the basis of power, the inequalities between
provider and consumer are frequently concealed by the idea that a
professional service is offered .... Indeed, the inherent power and
domination of the situation are disguised insofar as the monopoly
created by specialist knowledge has been legitimated by the sanction
oflaw and professionalism. 37
Disciplinary identity and professionalization are key markers of the development of discourse.
Discourses, of course, cannot float free . In order to do the work of constituting and disciplining bodies, of inscribing the meanings of the social order
into bodies, they must be incarnated in social practices. Discourses and practices stand in reciprocal relationship: discourses define the rules for practices,
which in turn embody those discourses.
Discourses, then, are reproduced into the social world by techniques of
discipline, by the practices of bodies on which they are inscribed. As Frank
notes:
Theory needs to apprehend the body as both medium and outcome
of social "body techniques," and society as both medium and outcome of the sum of these techniques. Body techniques are socially
given-individuals may improvise on them but rarely make up any
for themselves-but these techniques are only instantiated in their
practical use by bodies, on bodies. Moreover, these techniques are as
much resources for bodies as they are constraints on them; constraints enable as much as they restrict. 38
In other words, through their enactment these techniques produce bodies that
embody the commitments of the wider social order; they produce "docile bodies." And it is through the creation of such bodies, that then go on to act in
the world in self-motivated ways, that practices further realize (make real) and
reproduce the commitments of the discourses in the world.
Discourses are legitimated in part by being embedded in institutions, social
organizations which have attained sufficient power to render their discourses
true. Institutions, Frank writes, "have a specificity within both space and time.
A discourse can only be spoken or enacted; it is nowhere but in that act or
speech. An institution is a physical place where one can go, which mayor may
not be there any longer."39
Institutions, then, provide both a centralized social space for exponential
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consolidation of productive power as well as visible social sanction for the
truths put forward in a particular discourse. Such institutionalization, at least
in our culture, further reinforces the "scientific" character of the discourse's
growing body of knowledge.
Further, institutions enable methods of surveillance that are crucial to the
mapping of the bodies within their population as well as the process of normalization. Via disciplines like medicine, certain attitudes and practices come
to prevail as normal and acceptable. Institutionally sanctioned discourses both
define the "normal" and, through techniques and practices, encourage individuals to regulate and achieve her or his own conformity with the established
rules.4 0
Disciplinary matrices of discourses, techniques, and institutions are able
to exercise power in this decentralized manner insofar as the discourse is able
to sustain a regime of truth. "Truth" in this sense points to the creation of
knowledge as a function of power (power, as noted above, which is understood
not negatively but as productive) . Truth is a product of discursive practices
understood to emerge only within a structure of rules, practices, and institutions that control the discourse and collaborate to establish a given claim as
"true." Knowledge shaped by discourses, empowered by institutions, and
wielded through techniques and practices thus has the power to make itself
true.
Truth then is embodied and reproduced through "rituals of truth," practices shaped according to the rules of the discourse which then, not surprisingly, reinforce the truth claims of the discourse (one might think, for example,
of the "truth" of the anthropological claim that we are autonomous individuals
embodied and reproduced through the practice of advance directives) . Through
these many factors, the networks of productive power serve to produce, via
inscribed bodies, particular styles of subjectivity. Subjects are both produced
within discourses and simultaneously subjected to discourses. Such subject
production is one component of the process of normalization.
These, then, are the components of a Foucauldian disciplinary matrix. By
not allowing attention to be diverted from bodies, such an analysis seeks to
unmask how particular discourses-particular fields of knowledge and truth
claims-are used in conjunction with institutionalized practices to effect social
and political ends, even while rhetorically claiming to be apolitical, neutral, and
objective. It turns attention not to abstract ideas or disembodied "wills" but
rather to the usually covert operations of productive power, power that produces
particular kinds of embodied subject-citizens and in doing so reproduces the
body of the state.

The Disciplinary Matrix of Bioethics
Equipped with an outline of disciplinary matrices and how they function, we
can tum now to the field of bioethics itself. One might counter that the connection between bioethics and the state is already inferred in the phrase "public
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bioethics."" This analysis seeks not only to establish that fact but to display
the intricate connections between the various types of bioethics, suggesting
that they ought rather be understood as coordinated aspects of an overarching
matrix rather than as conceptually and practically distinct activities. By narrating bioethics as an institutionally located set of discursive practices, its function
as a normalizing discipline in service to state and market becomes disturbingly
clear.

Bioethics as Discourse
In historical perspective, discursive formation entails a discontinuous trajectory in which one can plot the emergence of a new discourse and the decline
of an old one. Although such a history will often be recounted as seamless,
more often it is one of ruptures and radical breaks. As history is written by the
winners, so "the persons and professions that rose to prominence will tend to
write the history of the debate in a way that makes their rise seem somehow
natural. ".2
Such a pattern indeed characterizes recent histories of the development of
the field ofbioethics. As per the standard narrative of the genesis ofbioethics,
its earliest origins lay among theologians, but substantive theological discourse
was quickly replaced by the more advanced discourse of philosophy. Kevin
Wildes narrates this standard account, that bioethics emerged because of the
increased technologization of medicine in the 1960s and that theological ethics
was pushed aside because "philosophical ethics offered the hope of resolving
such questions without appealing to the faith of a particular community. "'3
Wildes further proclaims the canonical narrative, highlighting the transition
from theology to (in his own words) secular or civil religion:
Bioethics has emerged as a field that is distinct from theological
ethics and traditional physician ethics even though both disciplines
were important to the development of the field .... [Olne needs to
understand why theological voices receded from the field . ... The
turn toward a secular bioethics became a search for a secular or civil
religion that might bind the sentiment of citizens who were at least
nominally divided by religions, cultures, or other differences."
The transition here is cast as seamless, logical, necessary.
But is this the only way to reconstruct this history? Is this the most accurate
way to tell this story? John Evans, in fact, narrates the same history quite
differently.45 He helpfully debunks the dominant myths that shape the recent
histories ofbioethics, including those that suggest that the principles' approach
to bioethics was necessitated by expanding commitments to democracy or stories that plot such developments as "natural" progressions. Over against the
accounts that claim that the dominant approach to bioethics is necessitated by
the pluralistic nature of contemporary U.S. society, Evans convincingly demonstrates that the growth and institutional embodiment of bioethics in the
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United States, via government advisory commissions, took shape precisely as
a way to circumvent pluralism, to "avoid more direct democratic control."46 As
he demonstrates, the pluralist model of democracy was in fact "unacceptable
to the scientists, who feared that an 'excitable' public would shut down not
only [human genetic engineering] research, but other research in their home
jurisdiction that the public did not understand."47 They were fearful, in other
words, of funding cuts,." pointing to the hidden economic substrate of all these
discussions.
Bioethics, then, emerged as a mechanism for shaping and controlling the
hoi polloi. A first step toward such an end would be to create a body of esoteric,
technical, formal knowledge that would be portrayed as inaccessible to the
common person while simultaneously constituting objects of knowledge and
defining the acceptable parameters for discussion. Although many bioethicists
protest the characterization of their field as one of specialized knowledge (a
claim made most often by detractors) one finds such descriptions with relative
frequency. Most often such claims arise within conversations about hospitalbased ethics consultation. David Casarett and his colleagues note that some
"contend that the ethicist is a specialist who possesses expertise in moral theory
... [that] ethicists, like physicians possess a unique fund of knowledge,
problem-solving techniques, experience and techniques that allows them to
solve complex moral problems."49 Nancy Dubler paternalistically states the
claim in a via negativa when she maintains: "It is simply not within the purview
of most patients and family members to understand the complex nature of the
moral judgments facing them."so
Though the precise content of this knowledge base remains coritested
within the realms of hospital-based ethics consultation, it has become well
established within the realm of public bioethics. Bioethics' specialized knowledge defines the acceptable parameters of discussion, prescribing certain ways
of talking about topics and excluding others (i.e., rules of inclusion and exclusion) . Substantively rational arguments and religious language have been systematically excluded, or at least carefully positioned so as to be mostly irrelevant
within public bioethics. While dominated by a formal, instrumental rationality,'1 public bioethics privileges a particular point of view, a particular conception of "the good" and of the ends that society and individuals within it must
necessarily pursue and preserve. 52 Evans captures it well when he notes that it
operates "with a very constrained list of universal, commensurable ends that
have become institutionalized by the dominant profession in the debate."'3
These ends are, of course, the principles of autonomy, beneficence, nonmaleficence, and justice. 54
As the above accounts make clear, specialized, technical knowledge is inextricably intertwined with professionalization, the creation of experts or specialists.ss Professions are defined, in fact, by their role as those who apply a
distinct system of knowledge to a well-defined set of problems delimited within
a particular jurisdiction. Insofar as such knowledge is abstract, professional
training is necessary to know how it is to be applied. s6 That bioethics has
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become a "profession" is little contested.57 Evans fleshes out the demographics
of this shift:
While the bioethics profession has been strengthening its jurisdiction over ethical decision making in public bioethical debates, it has
grown even stronger in its other jurisdiction of decision making in
hospitals (clinical bioethics). The bioethicists have also increasingly
taken on the trappings of a classic profession, with a professional
association of 1 ,500 members; 200 centers, departments, and programs; an academic degree (a master's in bioethics from the University of Pennsylvania and a Ph.D. in bioethics from various other universities). There is even a debate about licensing: who is qualified to
be a clinical bioethicist and to offer ethical judgments in hospitals?
Licensing, and other internal and external controls over who is a legitimate member of the profession, is the hallmark of an increasingly successfu' profession. The organization that accredits hospitals
has required since 1998 that every hospital have a mechanism for
resolving ethical problems that arise.58
In the words of Henk ten Have: "In a certain sense, ethics has become part
and parcel of the technological order. It has been professionalized as an autonomous discipline external to medical practice. It is dominated by an engineering model of moral reasoning and impregnated with the idea of a technical
rationality, applying principles to practices."59
In an interesting twist on the standard discussions of professionalization,
Tod Chambers insightfully recounts how central the image of "centering" has
been to the internal contests shaping the field over the past thirty-five years.60
Centering narratives trace the "migration" of the practice ofbioethics from the
academic realm to that of the hospital or clinic; from the realm of "theory" into
the realm of "action"; from philosophical training to medical training, with the
rise of clinical bioethics. His story closes with more recent attempts to wrest
bioethics from both philosophy and medicine by sociologists. 61 With each
move, such centering strategies have functioned as attempts to establish authority, legitimacy, and jurisdiction within the field by defining which conceptual tools shape the field and who ought rightly be included as a conveyor of
bioethical power.62
As Chambers notes, all these scholars and more use the metaphors of
inside-outside to describe this shift in their work. 63 Intriguingly, the same metaphors shape the discussion on religion and bioethics. The conversation revolves around phrases such as whether religions should be "included" in public
bioethics, how they might "contribute to" the debate, "how a religious community might enter into the discussions in bioethics,"64 or how they might
"influence" public bioethics. True to the founding myth, religion and theology
must be located "outside" the public sphere in such a way that they must
"enter" it, be "included" or "influence" it, as if from a distance. Yet perhaps a
mark of how completely irrelevant theology has become to bioethics, the re-
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centering of the field away from theology does not even enter into Chambers's
account.
Evans's sociological analysis of the growth ofbioethics also demonstrates
how the discourse of bioethics clearly functions as an "extralocal text," in
Smith's sense of the term. As he documents, once the Belmont principles were
established, bioethicists began to apply them and their form of argumentation
beyond their original focus in the ethics of human experimentation. 6s Capturing the work of Belmont in textbook form, Beauchamp and Childress's Principles of Biomedical Ethics expanded the form and content of this approach to
apply to almost all ethical issues in science, medicine, and society.66 The twin
sanctions of public approval and an authoritative textbook fueled principlism's
growth, creating an "enormous demand" for ethics training, spawning a new
and ongoing industry of books, workshops and courses "designed to make 'the
theories and methods of ethics' 'readily available to more people in a shorter
period of time.' "67 As a result, this particular method increasingly shaped
bioethical discussion across localities-in the academy, the literature, the public forum, the media, and the clinic. As David Rothman notes, "the new rules
for the laboratory permeated the examining room, circumscribing the discretionary authority of physicians. The doctor-patient relationship was modeled
on the form of the researcher-subject; in therapy, as in experimentation, formal
and informal mechanisms of control and a new language of patients' rights
assumed unprecedented importance."68 The long arm of state policy reaches
into all levels of the social body.

Techniques and Practices of Bioethics
As James Lindemann Nelson notes, bioethicists "wield explicitly normative
techniques."69 The discipline ofbioethics, in other words, comprises a distinct
set of practices, techniques by which discourses are enacted, inscribed onto
bodies, and thereby reproduced as truthful in the world. These techniques
mediate the "extralocal texts" of the bioethics canon into local settings.
Bette-Jane Crigger, in her account of hospital-based ethics consultation,
provides one of the most straightforward accounts of bioethics as a practice.
Noting from the outset that bioethics has become "established as a particular
form of practice," the intent of her essay is to explore the ways in which "bioethics does a further sort of cultural work that tends not to be recognized. "70
Although working with a slightly different sense oflocal and extralocal knowledge, Crigger's account ofbioethics reflects Frank's account of how practices
mediate extralocal texts, making it possible for abstract norms to shape local
actions, to interpret individual bodies. Speaking first of medicine, she notes:
Medicine operates as a paradigm of meanings on at least two levels:
as a system of concrete, local, ready-made meanings, and as a system of abstract, global, negotiated meanings. As a system of local,
that is clinical, meanings, medicine construes individuals' privately
experienced sensations as symptoms and signs upon which to base
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diagnosis, recommend treatment, and assess prognosis. That is,
medicine names and thus confers a particular kind of socially recognized significance ("illness" or "disease" of a given sort) on personal
bodily experience .... There is a fixed set of indicators to be deployed in construing embodied experience .... Overlaying this "local
knowledge" of the clinic, however, is a system of more abstract and
far-reaching meanings that link medicine-or better perhaps, patients' embodied relationship with medicine-to the wider social order. 71
These higher order meanings, she notes, are "abstract and self-consciously
normative" as well as "profoundly social."72 Each moment of clinical practicebe it a practice of medicine or bioethics-realizes these higher order meanings
in the world and serves to reproduce them, slowly working to transform the
world into its image: "Each clinical encounter offers the prospect of incrementally transforming the set of meanings upon which not simply the immediate
participants, but also the wider culture, may draw, refashioning the universe
of discourse within which the next encounter will take place."73 Ethics consultation stands as a vehicle for negotiating between the local and higher order
meanings, offering, "the potential not only to 'discover' normative meanings
in clinical decisions, but also actively to create new norms and values in the
process of making those decisions.""
Such a dynamic could be displayed for each bioethics practice. One will
suffice for our purposes. Consider the practice of informed consent. Rothman,
above, has noted how the practice of informed consent has reshaped the clinical
encounter in the direction of the politics of the laboratory; the patient-physician
relationship now more closely resembles the subject-researcher relationship.
Drawing on the normative anthropology captured in the primary end of bioethics-the principle of autonomy-the practice of informed consent constructs the patient as first and foremost, primarily, essentially an autonomous
subject, even though the patient's autonomy may be severely compromised by
illness or even though their own anthropology-should they hail from a nonWestern culture-provides no space for contemporary U.S. concepts of autonomy. The practice of informed consent shapes patients by persuading them
(or coercing them, since most medical procedures will not be performed without a signed document) to locate themselves under the rubric of autonomous
consent, to understand their relationship with the physician as somewhat contractual (based on a signed document, one which waives many of their rights),
as consumers who are "choosing" a particular course of medical treatment,
having weighed the advantages and disadvantages of the options.

Institutionalization
Institutions, as noted earlier, are social organizations that have attained sufficient power to render their discourses true. The institutional dimension of
bioethics takes two main forms. Clearly, the main institutional form ofbioeth-
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ics has been the U.S. government, in the form of government advisory commissions. Evans traces the dominance of principlism to the increased scope of
state intervention in issues related to science and medicine. Pointing to an
obvious but often overlooked fact: "A blunt indicator of this spread in state
interest are the titles of the first and second government bioethics commissions. The 'National Commission' was 'for the Protection of Human Subjects
of Biomedical and Behavioral Research.' The 'President's Commission' was
'for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral
Research.' " 75
Evans establishes the crucial role played by these commissions in establishing the parameters of truth. First, they determined which arguments would
count as legitimate, thereby granting jurisdiction to some professions over
others. 76 The replication of this mode of reasoning in subsequent government
commissions reinforced those truth claims. Second, these parameters for argumentation were codified into law via government regulations. As Evans
notes:
The influence of this new profession grew rapidly. Through the influence of the first government advisory commission, its form of argumentation was written into public law as the proper method of
making ethical decisions about research involving human subjects.
Henceforward all researchers at institutions that receive federal
funds would have to learn and adopt this form of argumentation. 77
It is important to note that the power of law was reinforced by force of economics. The Belmont Report, by translating its reasoning into government
regulation, which was tied to government funding, rendered the principles'
approach and its formal rationality to be the 'truth' vis-a-vis public bioethics.
This is the case now not only for human subjects research but for the clinical
sector as welL'8 Indeed, bioethics has become a primary agent of the presence
of the state in the practices of research and medicine.
From policy through law and economics, this new regime of truth has
been further reinforced by the institutionalization of the theoretical apparatus
supporting the discourse via the production of knowledge within the academic
realm. The 'truth' of Belmont was first expanded-almost evangelically-by
Beauchamp and Childress's Principles of Biomedical Ethics and its aftermath.
Yet this dissemination, of course, was not accidental. As James Lindemann
Nelson notes: "The birth of principlism itself is intertwined with the advent of
state intervention in ethics ... . It is also well known that the Belmont principles were created at the urging of the state, and enacted as regulations, with
the help of Kennedy Institute members who were simultaneously writing Principles of Biomedical Ethics. "79
One can trace additional links between the quiet hand of the state and the
culture of academic bioethics. As Evans notes:

Since journals refuse to publish results from research not reviewed
by IRBs [Institutional Review Boards], the principles became the
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standard not only for federally funded research, but for privately
sponsored research as well. This was a huge resource given to the
new profession ofbioethics in its competition with other professions:
the government was essentially requiring researchers at every research institution and hospital in the nation to learn its form of argumentation. 80
The linkage between the institutions of state, clinical research, and the academy
render a clean distinction between "public bioethics" and other realms of ethics
(i.e., foundational, clinical, institutional, community, etc.) problematic. Here
we see the reification (one could say, the fetishization) of the substance of
bioethics: its content and parameters "do not seem to have been created by
anyone but is just 'common sense' or even 'fact' -and takes on a life independent of its creator."81
Thus, tracing the institutional infrastructure ofbioethics begins to unmask
the intimate relationship between bioethics and the state. Even if one was
narrowly to construe public bioethics as concerned with the crafting of public
policy, etymology would lead to the same conclusion. As Ruth Malone notes,
the Greek origins of the word policy "link it to citizenship, government, polity,
citizen, city. That is, the idea of policy arises originally from the relationship
of citizens to one another in a common public space."82 Indeed, as the literature
on the rise of formal rationality indicates, the state is one of the foremost
proponents of formal rationality.s' Thus, the state appears not only as an historical factor in the rise of bioethics but indeed as so critically constitutive of
the discourse itself that bioethics might rightly be construed as itself an apparatus of the state.

The State, Bioethics, and Normalization
Foucault's account of disciplinary matrices seeks in part to demonstrate how
the state/social order effectively shapes the subjectivities of citizens within their
purview to embody that social order's normative claims, in order to reproduce
those norms toward the end of maintaining, furthering, or reproducing that
state/social order.8' As mentioned earlier, this process of producing docile bodies is known as normalization.
Evans, as we observed, debunks the claim made in the recent histories of
bioethics that the principles approach was required by our society's increasing
recognition of pluralism or what he calls the "expanding democracy" explanation. 8S Rather, as he notes, this story masks a deep disconnect between the
objectives of the allied scientific-government complex and the populace. The
first government advisory commission, the National Commission (1973), he
argues, was "instructed by Congress to create a set of ends," ends that "had to
be portrayed as universally held by the citizens, but had to be applied without
a method of determining empirically what the ends of the citizens were."86 Its
subsequent task, as outlined in the previous section, was to establish these
ends as truth, to diffuse them throughout the institutional infrastructure of
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research and patient care, and through the practices of bioethics to persuade
the citizenry to adopt these as their own ends.
Crigger captures this normalizing function in the practice of hospitalbased ethics consultations. For Crigger, bioethics consultation poses a paradox.
On the one hand, bioethics' "peril" is that it may "work toward imposing on
patients a particular, content-laden vision of what the dominant culture perceives to be morally most significant and most appropriate. "87 Yet its peril is
equally its promise, as she notes.
The practice of bioethics consultation in clinical settings not only
guides individual decisions, but just as importantly announces the
dominant culture's commitment to fashioning a common moral order in a pluralistic society. That commitment and the practices in
which it is inscribed in the clinic hold both promise and peril.
Promise in that ethics consultations may indeed promote a common
moral idiom, if not also a stronger commonality of norms . .. [Bioethics] work(s) toward shaping some significant portion of a shared
moral order.88
Indeed, for Crigger, "the moral and political authority of ethics consultation on
this model are seen to derive from a societal mandate to foster shared decision
making. "89
Yet can this promise be fulfilled without imposing culturally dominant
views of the good on patients? It is hard to see how it will be avoided. In fact,
Casarett et al. obliquely point to this inevitability: "It is rare," they note, "that
an ethics consultant can simply hand down an opinion. In fact, that typically
happens only when the primary issue has been legally resolved, or, to put it
another way, when a national discourse has produced a consensus that is then
imposed by the state."90
Thus, the normative claims of the liberal political philosophy that shapes
the social order are, through the practices ofbioethics, subtly prioritized. More
powerfully, although claiming that particular goods are permitted to exist in
their private spaces, an important component of the normative infrastructure
is that such particular convictions ought not be held too tightly; all commitments must ultimately be negotiable. Casarett et al., in their reflections on the
process of ethics consultation, highlight this dynamic:
Often, the immediate obstacle to consensus is unwillingness to engage in dialogue .. .. Consensus is fragile and is easily disrupted
when one or more participants hold tenaciously to a principle or
value. The fragility of consensus requires that all participants, including the ethics consultant [though equally this would include the
patient or physician], be willing to reconsider their own normative
claims. Indeed, this is the only way normative validity can be evaluated . .. . Genuine understanding of the issues involved may threaten

RELIGION AND THE DISCIPLINARY MATRIX OF BIOETHICS

109

deeply held beliefs about the values that make collaborative social
life possible. Just as allocation decisions frequently require us to
make choices that call into question certain fundamental values that
hold society together, moral argumentation in clinical ethics highlights troubling choices that we might prefer to keep hidden. Ethical
deliberation requires participants to examine deeply held values
such as the sanctity of life, the primacy of autonomy, and the commonly held view that lives do not have a dollar value. These threads
make up the fabric of our social existence. To bring them to the surface in order to examine and weigh them threatens the integrity of
the view we have of ourselves and our society.91
In the end, all particular commitments must bow to the overarching norm of
consensus.
But it is no longer only the common moral idiom of autonomy that bioethics serves to normalize among the citizenry through its practices; bioethics
more recently appears to be serving as an agent for the increasingly powerful
alliance between state and market. The standard portrayal of public interaction
around questions ofbioethics is one of discourse, argument, persuasion, and
consensus. Yet often this image is bolstered by that bizarre fiction of "the
marketplace of ideas" (a metaphor rendered even more absurd in these days
of global capitalism). Can the capitalist resonances be accidental?92
Troyen Brennan abandons any pretense ofbioethics' neutrality and maintains that the future of the field lies in embodying more consistently the commitments of political liberalism and, indeed, the market. Brennan calls for a
new medical ethics that reflects "the public morality ofliberalism" and respects
the resource constraints of "market justice. "93 But although Brennan issues
this as a call for bioethics to move toward, others acknowledge how deeply
bioethics is indebted to and allied with market economics. 94 Ruth Malone focuses on the economic infrastructure of bioethics, noting that although medicine and bioethics once framed its discourse in military terms, more recent
metaphors have shifted to the language of the market. 95 As she notes:
The market metaphor has assumed a prominent place in U.S . discourse on medicine and health policy, displacing an earlier military
metaphor ("battling disease," "doctor's orders") still in use but now
considerably less prominent. . .. [T]his shift in language has been
extremely effective in promoting a different understanding of medicine and health care .. . . [T]he metaphor has been taken up readily,
perhaps due to its compatibility with the economism of much health
services research methodology, such as cost-benefit and costeffectiveness studies. 96
Metaphors, of course, do not merely label things; they form our concepts,
create the parameters for action, define what can even be seen as a problem
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or issue. 97 Market metaphors within bioethics function as extralocal texts, enhancing bioethics' ability to mold health care institutions, practitioners, and
patients as increasingly ideal consumers. Market metaphors embody particular
philosophical presuppositions about the nature of the person and the nature
of social interaction:
In markets, the relationship to the other is primarily, if not solely,
instrumental: the other is necessary only as a means to the end of
purchase or sale of products. Buyers' and sellers' relations are based
in contractual obligations of business that do not extend to concern
for or dependence on one another.. . . The product-market metaphor
relies on the self-interested utility-maximizer view of human agents
that is congruent with neoclassical economics, in which individuals
make choices based on their perceptions of what will benefit them
most. Agency is reduced to rational choices made to buy or to sell, a
matter of exerting preferences rather than of acting in accordance
with constitutive values or concerns. 98
Market metaphors are likewise deeply enmeshed with the images that shape
standard displays of public bioethics. As Malone notes:
The product-market metaphor works for talking about policy in several important ways: we understand policy at least partially in terms
of political negotiation, which bears more than a passing resemblance to negotiations for market goods. And we view the practice of
policymaking as one in which choices must be made among different ideas or viewpoints, much as a shopper in a market must
choose among competing brands of soap. Also, we sustain the cultural myth of "objectivity" as a desirable and achievable goal in policymaking, congruent with the moral impassivity of the market. 99
Malone sees deep incongruities between such an anthropology and health care
policy, which at least in theory "addresses how we as a society will deal with
sick and injured people who must depend on the care and concern of others .
. . . This view of human agency as instrumental rationality leaves little space
for the kinds of actions that embody different values-for example, generosity,
mercy, or solidarity."'oo
In reality, however, this is not an incongruity but rather a Foucauldian
window into the operative but obscured foundations of bioethics, a window
that Malone's own words suggest:
The product-market conception of health policy (and health care)
also helps to keep the experience of suffering safely at bay for us ... .
Sickness, as others have noted, represents a challenge to the social
order. If the perceived need for policy solutions to social problems
may be understood as a confrontation with uncontrolled elements,
the product-market metaphor suggests a restoration of order: a rule-
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based mechanism (the market) that both preserves and controls the
autonomous self In the quite recent past, this has been largely a
function of medicine: we have a vast and illuminating literature on
the medicalization of social problems .. . . The market has begun to
supplant even medicine as a dominant mechanism of social control. 'O'
Not coincidentally, Evans (evidencing his debt to Weber) traces the dominance
of principlism to the development of double-entry bookkeeping in 1494, which
paved the way for modern capitalism and formal rationality. The logic of principlism, he argues, is isomorphic with the logic of accounting. The principles
of bioethics function as units of commensuration-akin to other commensurable metrics such as utility, risk-benefit analysis , profit, and money.'02
In short, much of public bioethics functions as a normalizing practice that
masks the economic interests and dynamics that are the real forces that shape
public policy. As Ed Pellegrino notes: "In stem cell research, for example, commercial and technological imperatives dominate the decisions under the guise
of a value-free agreement among 'reasonable' people who will not be so benighted as to invoke some transcendental source of morality in support of their
position.",o3 How metaphorical is it, we might ask, when Albert Jonsen refers
to the principles ofbioethics as "the common coin of moral discourse"?,o4

Theology and the Disciplinary Matrix of Public Bioethics
More could be said, but for now, we come to the end of a rather different
narration of the practice of public bioethics.lOs Where, then, does this leave the
question of religion? Clearly, a thoroughgoing constructive account of the relationship between religion and public bioethics would take me beyond the
limits of this chapter. Let me indicate, instead, the direction such an account
might take.
Over against standard responses to the question of religion and bioethics,
this alternative construal ofbioethics forces a question: Is it the proper task of
religion to contribute to, support, undergird, disseminate, and so on, the disciplinary matrix of the modern social order? Is it the job of religion to assist
the state in the management of bodies within its purview? Is it the task of
Christianity to assist the state in normalizing its citizens according to particular
canons of philosophical and economic "truths," especially norms such as autonomous individualism, adversarial rights , or utility, which are deeply at odds
with the central truths of the faith? Is it proper to Christianity to aid the state
in producing docile citizens, those who have internalized market paradigms of
consumer choice so deeply that they apply them to all aspects of their lives,
including the realm of moral discernment?
It is not clear that many authors-theologians and scholars of religion
included-would not assent to the above questions, at least in their broad
outlines. Time and again, religion is cast as instrumental to the ends and needs
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ofbioethics. 106Too many accounts of how to "relate" religion to public bioethics
end up being little more than attempts to make a kinder and gentler Leviathan.
But Leviathan it remains. And theologians do little to challenge the idolatrous
and heretical claims of the state. 107
To answer "no" to the above questions will be to issue a radical call. For
to answer "no" will be a call to orient religion (or, more accurately, theological
reflection on medicine and healing) toward a different social body. If Foucault's
account is valid, truths (as known, as productive) do not exist apart from the
discourses in which they are embedded, discourses that inscribe bodies into
certain visible practices which are institutionally extended. Truth, in other
words, sits in a complex relationship to power-the power to produce bodies
and, more important, to reproduce particular social bodies. Theology, indeed,
is such a discourse-a field of knowledge that forwards a regime of truth by
aiming toward the reproduction of the social body of the church through concrete, embodied disciplinary practices. To answer "no" to the above questions
is to issue a call for the church.
And this, of course, is why bioethics has left theology behind. For inextricable from substantive theological discourse is the one social body with the
real potential to challenge the unbridled authority of the state, the one that the
state has, since the sixteenth century, been trying to render powerless. l OS Is it
indeed a coincidence that shortly after medical ethics emerged within theological circles, the state-biotech-market complex quickly mobilized to consolidate
disciplinary oversight, deftly circumscribing religion to the sphere of autonomy/informed consent, thereby evacuating it of any independent power? 109
Forty years later, any pretensions on the part of the church to encroach on
the disciplinary authority of the state meets with fierce resistance. As Catholic
hospitals find, their attempt to embody in their institutional practices particular
visions of the good or common good (such as the sanctity and dignity of life)
via a refusal of certain practices is increasingly considered unacceptable. The
scathing invective with which Catholic hospitals are derided by organizations
such as "MergerWatch" and the recent legislative assaults on Catholic hospitals' practices regarding emergency contraceptives (which are largely misrepresented in the popular press) and "conscience clauses" for health care professionals evidence that, indeed, bodies are the site upon which power is
contested. 110
In the end, the relationship between theology and the disciplinary matrix
of public bioethics must remain both critical and constructive. If Christianity
is to be truthful and liberatory, it must first "query and unmask the dynamics
of power" embedded in the discipline of bioethics. The important critical task
is to uncover the hidden processes-in its discourse, in its practices, in its
institutional affiliations-by which medicine and bioethics seeks to normalize
us not toward freedom and autonomy (as the rhetoric would suggest) but rather
toward the ends of the state/biotech/market. Such was the work of this chapter.
And second, it must construct alternatives. In other words, the task of
Christian theology is to help people live as Christians through illness, healing,
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dying, and medical care. Its task is to forward the countercultural claim that
Christian convictions make a difference for who one is, for how one lives (i.e.,
how one is produced)-in short, to maintain the truthfulness of Christian
convictions. To do so will require practical, visible, institutional embodimentan embodiment in a church, not the state. To do so will require robust theological language, alternative discourses wedded to alternative practices and regimes of understanding self/body directed toward and sustained by a church
that is able to produce bodies which em-body these truths. Such a claim will,
indeed, strike fear into the hearts of those James Childress mentioned at the
outset. Yet such fears would indeed, I abjure, be unfounded. In the words of
William Cavanaugh:
If we understand the unity of body and soul, we must understand
that what is really at stake is not body-power versus soul-power, but
competing types of soul/body disciplines, some violent and some
peaceful. Christians must understand that the state's control of the
body is a control of the soul as well. The church must see that is
own disciplinary resources-Eucharist, penance, virtue, works of
mercy, martyrdom-are not matters of the soul which may somehow "animate" the "real world" of bodies, but are rather body/soul
disciplines meant to produce actions, practices, habits that are visible in the world. For the church to be a true social body it must reclaim not only its body but its soul from the state, and institute a
discipline which is truly Christlike-a power based in compassion
and martyrdom, suffering, and reconciliation, and not in a revived
Christendom. III
Through the disciplines of the Christian tradition, bioethics could find in theology a very different kind of power, not the power of state violence but the
power of peaceableness, a power made perfect through weakness. How fitting
this is for a practice whose center is sick and broken bodies.
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